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Single Idea 4086

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought ]

Full Idea

Kant thought that consciousness in general depends for its possibility on self-consciousness (or, as he called it, 'apperception').

Gist of Idea

Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception')

Source

report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Tim Crane - Elements of Mind 3.21

Book Ref

Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.71


A Reaction

What would Kant have made of Darwin? Consciousness looks very useful in small dim animals for registering survival information.


The 16 ideas with the same theme [consciousness as higher levels of thinking]:

Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane]
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]