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Single Idea 4087

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality ]

Full Idea

Intentionalism (the doctrine that all mental states are intentional) need not be the thesis that all mental states are propositional attitudes.

Clarification

Propositional attitudes are attitudes to proposiions, like believing or hoping it is raining

Gist of Idea

Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes

Source

Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.22)

Book Ref

Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.74


A Reaction

This points to the requirement for an intentionalist to prove that so-called 'qualia' states are essentially intentional, which is not implausible.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [what exactly is intentionality?]:

All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil]
Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi]
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]