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Full Idea
If I am conscious of a pain, the pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself.
Clarification
'Intentional' mental states are 'about' something
Gist of Idea
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
Source
John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 4.1)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.84
A Reaction
Crane quotes this to challenge it. Pain may be about apparent damage to the body. Pains are certainly informative.
| 3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
| 7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
| 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
| 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |