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Full Idea
The intentional object of a pain-state is a part or region of the body, not a pain-object.
Clarification
The 'intentional object' of a mental state is what it is about
Gist of Idea
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object
Source
Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.24)
Book Ref
Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.81
A Reaction
Plausible. Has anyone ever suffered from pain without some sense of what part of the body is actually in pain?
Related Idea
Idea 3366 Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
| 3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
| 7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
| 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
| 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |