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Single Idea 4093
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
]
Full Idea
There are plenty of cases of knowing how to do something, where that knowledge can also be expressed - without remainder, as it were - in propositional terms (such as knowing how to get to the Albert Hall).
Gist of Idea
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere)
Source
Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28)
Book Ref
Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.95
A Reaction
Presumably all knowing how could be expressed propositionally by God.
The
42 ideas
from 'Elements of Mind'
4063
|
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived.
[Crane]
|
4065
|
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
[Crane]
|
4067
|
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought
[Crane]
|
4066
|
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate
[Crane]
|
4069
|
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
[Crane]
|
4070
|
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
[Crane]
|
4071
|
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow
[Crane]
|
4072
|
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind
[Crane]
|
4073
|
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone
[Crane]
|
4074
|
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism
[Crane]
|
4075
|
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation
[Crane]
|
4076
|
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation
[Crane]
|
4077
|
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties
[Crane]
|
4078
|
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity
[Crane]
|
4079
|
Properties are causes
[Crane]
|
4080
|
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one
[Crane]
|
4082
|
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague
[Crane]
|
4083
|
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete
[Crane]
|
4084
|
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic
[Crane]
|
4085
|
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution
[Crane]
|
4068
|
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence
[Crane]
|
4087
|
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes
[Crane]
|
4089
|
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object
[Crane]
|
4090
|
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional
[Crane]
|
4092
|
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question
[Crane]
|
4091
|
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality
[Crane]
|
4093
|
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere)
[Crane]
|
4094
|
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience
[Crane]
|
4096
|
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions
[Crane]
|
4095
|
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes
[Crane]
|
4097
|
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs
[Crane]
|
4098
|
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent
[Crane]
|
4100
|
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false.
[Crane]
|
4101
|
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see
[Crane]
|
4102
|
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum
[Crane]
|
4104
|
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine
[Crane]
|
4103
|
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects
[Crane]
|
4105
|
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes
[Crane]
|
4106
|
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes
[Crane]
|
4107
|
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same
[Crane]
|
4108
|
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
[Crane]
|
4109
|
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual
[Crane]
|