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Single Idea 4108
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
]
Full Idea
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless. Is it really bitter, or really tasteless?
Gist of Idea
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
Source
Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44)
Book Ref
Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.147
A Reaction
A nice reinforcement of a classic Greek question. Good support for the primary/secondary distinction. Common sense, really.
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[qualities seeming to involve the observer]:
1727
|
Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible
[Aristotle]
|
16725
|
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced
[Aristotle]
|
5949
|
Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies
[Epicurus, by Plutarch]
|
20781
|
Non-graspable presentations are from what doesn't exist, or are not clear and distinct
[Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
|
16721
|
Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities
[Giles of Orleans]
|
7401
|
Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world
[Galileo, by Tuck]
|
5454
|
Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures
[Galileo]
|
22593
|
Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation
[Descartes]
|
15962
|
Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles
[Boyle, by Alexander,P]
|
15964
|
Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind'
[Boyle, by Alexander,P]
|
15973
|
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers)
[Locke, by Alexander,P]
|
7050
|
I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind'
[Locke, by Heil]
|
15979
|
Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object
[Locke]
|
19430
|
We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving
[Leibniz]
|
23638
|
Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them
[Reid]
|
5532
|
Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject
[Kant]
|
21447
|
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object
[Kant]
|
6498
|
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities
[Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
|
7440
|
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things
[Armstrong]
|
22412
|
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences
[McGinn]
|
22421
|
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception?
[McGinn]
|
22424
|
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise
[McGinn]
|
22425
|
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings
[McGinn]
|
6494
|
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
[Robinson,H]
|
6499
|
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
[Robinson,H]
|
6500
|
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
[Robinson,H]
|
4108
|
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
[Crane]
|
7044
|
Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us
[Heil]
|
7052
|
Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky
[Heil]
|
15061
|
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals
[Fine,K]
|
9118
|
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics
[Sorensen]
|
6375
|
The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness
[Polger]
|