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Single Idea 4149
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
]
Full Idea
When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions.
Gist of Idea
We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §329)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Philosophical Investigations', ed/tr. Anscombe,E. [Blackwell 1972], p.107
A Reaction
No, but words have properties, like being meaningful, or long, or beautiful. They are not abstractions, or empty counters which can be used for anything.
The
53 ideas
from 'Philosophical Investigations'
18743
|
Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure
[Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
|
6501
|
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections
[Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
|
7055
|
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein
[Wittgenstein, by Heil]
|
12576
|
Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on
[Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
|
23450
|
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world
[Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|
6567
|
For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are
[Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
|
4136
|
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life
[Wittgenstein]
|
4137
|
In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language
[Wittgenstein]
|
4138
|
Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow?
[Wittgenstein]
|
4139
|
Naming is a preparation for description
[Wittgenstein]
|
4140
|
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long
[Wittgenstein]
|
4141
|
Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross
[Wittgenstein]
|
4946
|
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family
[Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
|
2512
|
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language
[Wittgenstein]
|
6566
|
The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life
[Wittgenstein]
|
4142
|
To understand a sentence means to understand a language
[Wittgenstein]
|
6165
|
Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict
[Wittgenstein]
|
4143
|
One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying
[Wittgenstein]
|
6169
|
We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world
[Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
|
6166
|
Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual?
[Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
|
4144
|
Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language
[Wittgenstein]
|
11049
|
To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition
[Wittgenstein]
|
4145
|
How do words refer to sensations?
[Wittgenstein]
|
5676
|
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain
[Wittgenstein]
|
7875
|
If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it
[Wittgenstein]
|
4146
|
We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper)
[Wittgenstein]
|
4147
|
If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box
[Wittgenstein]
|
5659
|
If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public
[Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
|
5663
|
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's
[Wittgenstein]
|
19272
|
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel
[Wittgenstein]
|
4148
|
What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle
[Wittgenstein]
|
4149
|
We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions
[Wittgenstein]
|
4150
|
Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition
[Wittgenstein]
|
15106
|
Essence is expressed by grammar
[Wittgenstein]
|
4151
|
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar
[Wittgenstein]
|
4152
|
Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use
[Wittgenstein]
|
4153
|
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made?
[Wittgenstein]
|
4154
|
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life?
[Wittgenstein]
|
4155
|
We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them
[Wittgenstein]
|
6600
|
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns
[Wittgenstein]
|
4156
|
Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here"
[Wittgenstein]
|
4157
|
Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests
[Wittgenstein]
|
7092
|
If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it?
[Grayling on Wittgenstein]
|
4158
|
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria
[Wittgenstein]
|
6658
|
What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm?
[Wittgenstein]
|
22490
|
Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use
[Wittgenstein]
|
11079
|
How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition?
[Wittgenstein]
|
12606
|
Man learns the concept of the past by remembering
[Wittgenstein]
|
19273
|
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such
[Wittgenstein]
|
4159
|
The human body is the best picture of the human soul
[Wittgenstein]
|
4160
|
One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs
[Wittgenstein]
|
4161
|
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him
[Wittgenstein]
|
7392
|
If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions
[Dennett on Wittgenstein]
|