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Full Idea
Why does the feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process not come into the considerations of our ordinary life?
Gist of Idea
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life?
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §412)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Philosophical Investigations', ed/tr. Anscombe,E. [Blackwell 1972], p.124
A Reaction
Nice question. Presumably Wittgenstein has a quasi-behaviouristic answer. People don't now ignore it? They retreat into crazy spiritualism.
| 9114 | There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham] |
| 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
| 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
| 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
| 4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
| 3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
| 4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
| 3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
| 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
| 7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |