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Single Idea 4192

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity ]

Full Idea

Necessity has no meaning other than the irresistible sequence of the effect where the cause is given. All necessity is thus conditioned, and absolute or unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms.

Gist of Idea

All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity

Source

Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VIII)

Book Ref

Schopenhauer,Arthur: 'The World as Will and Idea', ed/tr. Berman,Jill and David [Everyman 1995], p.274


A Reaction

I.e. there is only natural necessity, and no such thing as metaphysical necessity. But what about logical necessity(e.g. 2+3=5)? I think there may be metaphysical necessity, but we can't know much about it, and we are over-confident in assessing it.


The 28 ideas with the same theme [general views on what gives rise to necessity]:

Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza]
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant]
All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer]
The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider]
Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider]
Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs]
Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum]