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Single Idea 4197

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals ]

Full Idea

One might want to divide the category of 'universals' into two sub-categories of properties and relations.

Gist of Idea

The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations

Source

E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'A Survey of Metaphysics' [OUP 2002], p.15

A Reaction

This means a Platonic form like 'horse' ends up as a cluster of properties and relations. Is a substance not also a universal?

The 45 ideas from 'A Survey of Metaphysics'

14581 The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
4205 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
4195 It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe]
4206 Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe]
4207 We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
4197 The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
4196 The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe]
4208 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe]
4209 The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
4210 If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe]
4211 Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]
4212 Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
4213 Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
4214 Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
4194 Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe]
4193 The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe]
4215 It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
4217 It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe]
4219 Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
4220 Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe]
4221 Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
4222 If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe]
4223 Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe]
4224 If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe]
4225 Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe]
4227 Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe]
4198 If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe]
4228 If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe]
4199 A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe]
4229 An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe]
4200 If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe]
4232 Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
4233 If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
4234 Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
4235 Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
4236 Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
4237 Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe]
4238 The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe]
4239 Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe]
4240 It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe]
4241 If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe]
4201 Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG]
4202 Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe]
4203 Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe]
4204 Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe]