more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 4211
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
]
Full Idea
In causation there is 'overdetermination' (c and d occurred, and were both sufficient for e), 'pre-emption' (c and d occurred, and d would have stepped in if c hadn't), or 'fail-safe' (if c hadn't occurred, d would have occurred and done it).
Gist of Idea
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case
Source
E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.179)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'A Survey of Metaphysics' [OUP 2002], p.179
A Reaction
Two safety nets together, two safety nets spaced apart, or a second net which pops in if the first breaks. Nice distinctions.
The
45 ideas
from 'A Survey of Metaphysics'
14581
|
The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members
[Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
|
4205
|
'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction)
[Lowe]
|
4195
|
It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility
[Lowe]
|
4206
|
Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump?
[Lowe]
|
4207
|
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds
[Lowe]
|
4197
|
The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations
[Lowe]
|
4196
|
The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete
[Lowe]
|
4208
|
'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual
[Lowe]
|
4209
|
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration
[Lowe]
|
4210
|
If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition
[Lowe]
|
4211
|
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case
[Lowe]
|
4212
|
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity
[Lowe]
|
4213
|
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities)
[Lowe]
|
4214
|
Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible
[Lowe]
|
4194
|
Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole
[Lowe]
|
4193
|
The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation
[Lowe]
|
4215
|
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers
[Lowe]
|
4217
|
It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology
[Lowe]
|
4219
|
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time
[Lowe]
|
4220
|
Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time
[Lowe]
|
4221
|
Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology
[Lowe]
|
4222
|
If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring?
[Lowe]
|
4223
|
Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics
[Lowe]
|
4224
|
If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects
[Lowe]
|
4225
|
Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things
[Lowe]
|
4227
|
Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract
[Lowe]
|
4198
|
If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship
[Lowe]
|
4228
|
If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects?
[Lowe]
|
4199
|
A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist
[Lowe]
|
4229
|
An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member
[Lowe]
|
4200
|
If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship).
[Lowe]
|
4232
|
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist
[Lowe]
|
4233
|
If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set
[Lowe]
|
4234
|
Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere
[Lowe]
|
4235
|
Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness
[Lowe]
|
4236
|
Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles
[Lowe]
|
4238
|
The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location
[Lowe]
|
4237
|
Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations
[Lowe]
|
4239
|
Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence
[Lowe]
|
4240
|
It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth
[Lowe]
|
4241
|
If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects
[Lowe]
|
4201
|
Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F'
[Lowe, by PG]
|
4202
|
Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance
[Lowe]
|
4203
|
Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties)
[Lowe]
|
4204
|
Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material
[Lowe]
|