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Full Idea
According to Quine, we find the ontological commitments of a theory by expressing it in first-order predicate logic, then determining what kind of entities must be admitted as bound variables if the theory is true.
Gist of Idea
Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth
Source
report of Willard Quine (Existence and Quantification [1966]) by E.J. Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics p.216
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'A Survey of Metaphysics' [OUP 2002], p.216
A Reaction
To me this is horribly wrong. The ontological commitments of our language is not the same as ontology. What are the ontological commitments of a pocket calculator?
| 5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
| 8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
| 4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
| 14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
| 16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
| 18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
| 16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
| 16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |