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Single Idea 4233

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism ]

Full Idea

If sets are particulars, a nominalist may say that 'blueness' is a set of particulars, but which set? If the particulars 'are blue' this threatens circularity - though resemblance is usually appealed to to avoid this.

Gist of Idea

If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set

Source

E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.355)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'A Survey of Metaphysics' [OUP 2002], p.355


A Reaction

This supports my suspicion that nominalism is superficially attractive and 'scientific', but when you dig deep into it the theory won't get off the ground without universals.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [universals are classes of things]:

You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]
In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]
Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]