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Single Idea 4235

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes ]

Full Idea

The trope theorist says that a cushion is just a 'bundle' of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness.

Gist of Idea

Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness

Source

E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.362)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'A Survey of Metaphysics' [OUP 2002], p.362

A Reaction

Certainly if you dispense with the idea of substance (which is clearly bad science even if it is good metaphysics), something like this is what remains of a cushion, though it sounds more epistemological than ontological. Only philosophers care about this

The 36 ideas with the same theme [the principles and concepts of trope theory]:

8511 Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
8508 A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
8509 A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
8510 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
15483 Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
18373 If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
11928 Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
8526 We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly]
10738 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
10739 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
10740 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
10741 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
7042 A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil]
10464 A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John]
10465 Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John]
10467 Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John]
8285 I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
4234 Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
4235 Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
4236 Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
4461 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
7934 Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
7958 Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
7972 Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
18864 The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]