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Single Idea 4253
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
]
Full Idea
Externalist accounts of non-inferential knowledge say what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief state and the situation which makes the belief true.
Gist of Idea
Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true
Source
David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973], 11.III.6)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'Belief Truth and Knowledge' [CUP 1981], p.157
A Reaction
Armstrong's concept is presumably a response to Quine's desire to 'naturalise epistemology'. Bad move, I suspect. It probably reduces knowledge to mere true belief, and hence a redundant concept.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[general issues about external justification]:
2555
|
For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions
[Locke, by Rorty]
|
6948
|
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
[Peirce]
|
4253
|
Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true
[Armstrong]
|
3830
|
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
|
8812
|
Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external
[Pollock]
|
8816
|
Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology
[Pollock]
|
3701
|
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs
[Bonjour]
|
4258
|
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
[Bonjour]
|
2776
|
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
[Dancy,J]
|
9382
|
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications'
[Burge]
|
3571
|
Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
|
3574
|
Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
|
2738
|
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
[Audi,R]
|
4065
|
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
[Crane]
|
6370
|
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
3755
|
Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology
[Bernecker/Dretske]
|
4254
|
Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification
[Kornblith]
|
3568
|
Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts?
[Cross,A]
|
17723
|
Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed
[Jenkins]
|
19704
|
Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications
[Vahid]
|