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Single Idea 4255

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism ]

Full Idea

Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism.

Clarification

'Foundational' theories base knowledge on something totally reliable

Gist of Idea

Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism

Source

Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], Intro)

Book Ref

'Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism', ed/tr. Kornblith,Hilary [Blackwell 2001], p.10


A Reaction

I don't see why there shouldn't be a phenomenalist, anti-realist version of externalism, which just has 'starting points' instead of a serious commitment to foundations.


The 16 ideas with the same theme [claim that knowledge foundations are possible]:

Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz]
If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]