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Full Idea
The fundamental question that must be answered by any acceptable version of foundationalism is: how are basic beliefs possible?
Clarification
'Basic beliefs' are those needing no further justification
Gist of Idea
The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
Source
Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I)
Book Ref
'Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism', ed/tr. Kornblith,Hilary [Blackwell 2001], p.11
A Reaction
This question seems to be asking for a justification for basic beliefs, which smacks of 'Who made God?' Look, basic beliefs are just basic, right?
1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
20795 | Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus] |
5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
23245 | Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
4582 | Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl] |
8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |