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Single Idea 4258
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
]
Full Idea
The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question.
Gist of Idea
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
Source
Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II)
Book Ref
'Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism', ed/tr. Kornblith,Hilary [Blackwell 2001], p.15
A Reaction
The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[general issues about external justification]:
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2555
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For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions
[Locke, by Rorty]
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6948
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Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
[Peirce]
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4253
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Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true
[Armstrong]
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3830
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In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
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8812
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Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external
[Pollock]
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8816
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Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology
[Pollock]
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3701
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Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs
[Bonjour]
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4258
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Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
[Bonjour]
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2776
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Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
[Dancy,J]
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9382
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Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications'
[Burge]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
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2738
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Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
[Audi,R]
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4065
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Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
[Crane]
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6370
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Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
[Pollock/Cruz]
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3755
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Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology
[Bernecker/Dretske]
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4254
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Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification
[Kornblith]
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3568
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Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts?
[Cross,A]
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17723
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Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed
[Jenkins]
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19704
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Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications
[Vahid]
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