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Full Idea
The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question.
Gist of Idea
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
Source
Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II)
Book Ref
'Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism', ed/tr. Kornblith,Hilary [Blackwell 2001], p.15
A Reaction
The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true.
| 4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
| 4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
| 4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
| 4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
| 4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
| 4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |