more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 4283

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion ]

Full Idea

A person who lives by sympathy may undermine the moral order as effectively as the one who lives by crime.

Gist of Idea

Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does

Source

Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.54)

Book Ref

Scruton,Roger: 'Animal Rights and Wrongs' [Demos 1996], p.54


A Reaction

A slightly chilling remark. Presumably one should not feel too much for suffering which is deserved. What about unavoidable suffering? It is certainly important to see that some suffering is morally good (e.g. grief or remorse).


The 20 ideas with the same theme [sympathetic concern for others' pain]:

The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle]
We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero]
Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza]
Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza]
People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza]
Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza]
The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau]
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin]
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche]
The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues [Nietzsche]
You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche]
Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche]
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche]
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche]
Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche]
Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum]
Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]