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Full Idea
In contemporary philosophy of action, there is a fervid debate about whether any intentional action must be prompted in part by desire, or whether it is possible to be moved to action by a belief alone.
Gist of Idea
Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient?
Source
Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro)
Book Ref
Hursthouse,Rosalind: 'On Virtue Ethics' [OUP 2001], p.15
A Reaction
I want a cool belief to be sufficient to produce an action, because it will permit at least a Kantian dimension to ethics, and make judgement central, and marginalise emotivism, which is the spawn of Satan.
| 16 | We avoid evil either through a natural aversion, or because we have acquired knowledge [Plato] |
| 22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
| 24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
| 20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
| 20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
| 4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |