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Single Idea 4327
[filed under theme 23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
]
Full Idea
Though it is sometimes said that deontologists 'take no account of consequences', this is manifestly false, for many actions we deliberate about only fall under rules or principles when we bring in their predicted consequences.
Gist of Idea
Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply
Source
Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Hursthouse,Rosalind: 'On Virtue Ethics' [OUP 2001], p.33
A Reaction
An important defence of deontology, which otherwise is vulnerable to the 'well-meaning fool' problem. It is no good having a good will, but refusing to think about consequences.
The
30 ideas
from 'On Virtue Ethics'
4325
|
Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient?
[Hursthouse]
|
4324
|
Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia
[Hursthouse]
|
4327
|
Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply
[Hursthouse]
|
4328
|
Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical
[Hursthouse]
|
4335
|
'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom
[Hursthouse]
|
4329
|
After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret
[Hursthouse]
|
4330
|
Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent
[Hursthouse]
|
4336
|
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases
[Hursthouse]
|
4334
|
Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues
[Hursthouse]
|
4337
|
Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences
[Hursthouse]
|
4339
|
According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right
[Hursthouse]
|
4343
|
We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples
[Hursthouse]
|
4341
|
Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life
[Hursthouse]
|
4338
|
Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases
[Hursthouse]
|
4340
|
You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest
[Hursthouse]
|
4346
|
The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well
[Hursthouse]
|
4351
|
It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous
[Hursthouse]
|
4349
|
Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action
[Hursthouse]
|
4350
|
If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith?
[Hursthouse]
|
4354
|
Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue
[Hursthouse]
|
4356
|
We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly
[Hursthouse]
|
4352
|
Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful'
[Hursthouse]
|
4353
|
If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally?
[Hursthouse]
|
4355
|
There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends
[Hursthouse]
|
4358
|
Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia
[Hursthouse]
|
4359
|
When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet
[Hursthouse]
|
4361
|
Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group
[Hursthouse]
|
4364
|
Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others
[Hursthouse]
|
4363
|
The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being?
[Hursthouse]
|
4365
|
We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons
[Hursthouse]
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