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Single Idea 4337
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
]
Full Idea
Adolescents tend to be much more gormless about consequences than they are about ideals.
Gist of Idea
Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences
Source
Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2 n12)
Book Ref
Hursthouse,Rosalind: 'On Virtue Ethics' [OUP 2001], p.60
A Reaction
Very accurate, I'm afraid. But this cuts both ways. They seem to need education not in virtue, but simply in consequences.
The
31 ideas
from Rosalind Hursthouse
4325
|
Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient?
[Hursthouse]
|
4324
|
Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia
[Hursthouse]
|
4328
|
Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical
[Hursthouse]
|
4327
|
Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply
[Hursthouse]
|
4335
|
'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom
[Hursthouse]
|
4336
|
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases
[Hursthouse]
|
4334
|
Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues
[Hursthouse]
|
4329
|
After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret
[Hursthouse]
|
4330
|
Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent
[Hursthouse]
|
4337
|
Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences
[Hursthouse]
|
4341
|
Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life
[Hursthouse]
|
4338
|
Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases
[Hursthouse]
|
4343
|
We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples
[Hursthouse]
|
4339
|
According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right
[Hursthouse]
|
4340
|
You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest
[Hursthouse]
|
4346
|
The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well
[Hursthouse]
|
4349
|
Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action
[Hursthouse]
|
4351
|
It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous
[Hursthouse]
|
4350
|
If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith?
[Hursthouse]
|
4354
|
Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue
[Hursthouse]
|
4356
|
We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly
[Hursthouse]
|
4355
|
There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends
[Hursthouse]
|
4352
|
Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful'
[Hursthouse]
|
4353
|
If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally?
[Hursthouse]
|
4359
|
When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet
[Hursthouse]
|
4358
|
Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia
[Hursthouse]
|
4361
|
Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group
[Hursthouse]
|
4364
|
Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others
[Hursthouse]
|
4363
|
The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being?
[Hursthouse]
|
4365
|
We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons
[Hursthouse]
|
20195
|
Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce
[Hursthouse, by Zagzebski]
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