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Full Idea
Doing what is, say, dishonest solely in the context of a tragic dilemma does not entail being dishonest, possessing that vice.
Gist of Idea
You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest
Source
Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3 n8)
Book Ref
Hursthouse,Rosalind: 'On Virtue Ethics' [OUP 2001], p.73
A Reaction
This seems right, although it mustn't be thought that the dishonesty is thereby excused. Virtuous people find being dishonest very painful.
| 5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle] |
| 21103 | Moral questions can only be decided by common opinion [Hume] |
| 22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
| 22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
| 22455 | Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B] |
| 4656 | A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover] |
| 4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
| 4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
| 4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
| 4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
| 20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
| 20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |