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Single Idea 4346

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings ]

Full Idea

The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well.

Gist of Idea

The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well

Source

Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Hursthouse,Rosalind: 'On Virtue Ethics' [OUP 2001], p.102


A Reaction

This is a critique of Hume, and of utlitarianism. It pushes us either to the concept of duty, or the concept of virtue (independent of right feeling).


The 9 ideas with the same theme [the feelings required for a virtuous disposition]:

At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]
It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle]
Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle]
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
If you lust after a woman, you have committed adultery [Jesus]
If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre]
Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham]
Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey]
The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse]