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Single Idea 4351
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
]
Full Idea
It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous.
Gist of Idea
It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous
Source
Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6)
Book Ref
Hursthouse,Rosalind: 'On Virtue Ethics' [OUP 2001], p.137
A Reaction
I personally believe that philosophy is the best route yet devised to the achievement of virtue, but it is clearly not essential. All the philosophers I meet are remarkably virtuous, but that may be a chicken/egg thing.
The
30 ideas
from 'On Virtue Ethics'
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4325
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Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient?
[Hursthouse]
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4324
|
Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia
[Hursthouse]
|
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4327
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Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4328
|
Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4335
|
'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4329
|
After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret
[Hursthouse]
|
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4330
|
Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4336
|
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4334
|
Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4337
|
Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4339
|
According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4343
|
We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4341
|
Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4338
|
Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases
[Hursthouse]
|
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4340
|
You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest
[Hursthouse]
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4346
|
The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4351
|
It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4349
|
Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4350
|
If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith?
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4354
|
Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4356
|
We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4352
|
Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful'
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4353
|
If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally?
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4355
|
There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends
[Hursthouse]
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|
4358
|
Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4359
|
When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet
[Hursthouse]
|
|
4361
|
Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group
[Hursthouse]
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4364
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Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others
[Hursthouse]
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4363
|
The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being?
[Hursthouse]
|
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4365
|
We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons
[Hursthouse]
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