more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 4369

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism ]

Full Idea

Aristotle believes cognition of particulars is more important for virtue than cognition of universals, ..and I would add that it is cognition not just of particulars, but of their value, that is, perception of them as good or beautiful.

Clarification

Universals are general ideas, rather than actual items in the world

Gist of Idea

It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good

Source

report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro

Book Ref

Achtenberg,Deborah: 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics' [SUNY 2002], p.3


A Reaction

This gets quickly to the heart of the problem, which is what fact about the particular is perceived which makes it good. Utilitarians are queueing up to answer this question. Interesting, though.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [there are no rules, so we must attend to details]:

It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka]
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse]