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Single Idea 4372
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
]
Full Idea
According to Aristotle, the incontinent person never acts against active knowledge of particulars, but either acts against knowledge that is possessed but not exercised, or knowledge that is not fully possessed, or against knowledge of universals alone.
Clarification
'Akrasia' is lack of self-control
Gist of Idea
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it
Source
comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b15) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 2.1
Book Ref
Achtenberg,Deborah: 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics' [SUNY 2002], p.24
A Reaction
This comments aims to bring Aristotle closer to Socrates (who says virtue IS reason), and it certainly fits with the high value which Aristotle normally places on reason.
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[failing to perform the action which is judged best]:
22511
|
Some reasonings are stronger than we are
[Philolaus]
|
195
|
No one willingly commits an evil or base act
[Socrates]
|
199
|
The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it
[Socrates]
|
1653
|
Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia)
[Vlastos on Socrates]
|
5843
|
People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do
[Socrates, by Xenophon]
|
5253
|
Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens
[Aristotle on Socrates]
|
24060
|
Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires
[Aristotle]
|
4383
|
Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions
[Burnyeat on Aristotle]
|
68
|
The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire
[Aristotle]
|
4318
|
Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action.
[Aristotle, by Cottingham]
|
4372
|
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it
[Achtenberg on Aristotle]
|
5254
|
Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge
[Aristotle]
|
5255
|
A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular
[Aristotle]
|
23317
|
Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
23318
|
Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
5257
|
Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance
[Aristotle]
|
23918
|
Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure
[Aristotle]
|
22574
|
A community can lack self-control
[Aristotle]
|
20850
|
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust
[Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
|
19365
|
Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad
[Leibniz, by Perkins]
|
22098
|
Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good
[Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
|
7209
|
There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse
[Nietzsche]
|
24117
|
We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control
[Nietzsche]
|
23878
|
Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action
[Weil]
|
6385
|
The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best
[Davidson]
|
4317
|
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded
[Williams,B, by Cottingham]
|
23996
|
Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions
[Blackburn]
|
4355
|
There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends
[Hursthouse]
|
23995
|
Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate
[Goldie]
|
20077
|
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency
[Stout,R]
|