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Single Idea 4374

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure ]

Full Idea

For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable.

Gist of Idea

For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable

Source

comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 5.6

Book Ref

Achtenberg,Deborah: 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics' [SUNY 2002], p.152


A Reaction

This never strikes me as very plausible. Pleasure may be a side-effect of the perception of value, but we can experience pleasure (e.g. a taste) without even knowing what the cause is, let alone whether we value it.


The 10 ideas with the same theme [what exactly pleasure is]:

Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza]
Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz]
Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
Pleasure needs dissatisfaction, boundaries and resistances [Nietzsche]
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche]
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]