more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 4380
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
]
Full Idea
Aristotle does not fully endorse the famous first sentence of the 'Ethics'; he does not think every action aims at some good - for one thing akratic action does not.
Clarification
'Akratic' actions are those which lack self-control
Gist of Idea
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not
Source
comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094a03) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.91 n25
Book Ref
'Essays on Aristotle's Ethics', ed/tr. Rorty,Amélie Oksenberg [University of California 1980], p.91
A Reaction
Nice point. Aristotle's claim never sounded right, and yet vice presumably aims at what it perceives as good. Socrates presumably endorses the opening sentence, though Aristotle wouldn't.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]:
4380
|
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not
[Burnyeat on Aristotle]
|
20041
|
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting
[Anscombe]
|
20072
|
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
20076
|
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
[Davidson]
|
20034
|
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs
[Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20033
|
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans
[Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20169
|
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another
[Kekes]
|
23146
|
Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions
[Driver]
|
20039
|
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act
[Stout,R]
|
20044
|
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification
[Stout,R]
|
20047
|
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds
[Stout,R]
|
20065
|
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action?
[Stout,R]
|
20067
|
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent
[Stout,R]
|
20078
|
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises
[Stout,R]
|
20023
|
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20022
|
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20025
|
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
[Wilson/Schpall]
|