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Single Idea 4391
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
]
Full Idea
Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth.
Gist of Idea
Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth
Source
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112a07)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.117
A Reaction
This presumably makes Aristotle a realist, and it seems to me that the concepts of 'opinion' or 'belief' are incomprehensible without the concept of truth.
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[the purpose or aim of beliefs]:
2050
|
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false
[Plato]
|
4391
|
Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth
[Aristotle]
|
1685
|
No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true
[Aristotle]
|
14050
|
We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes
[Epicurus]
|
9100
|
Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true
[William of Ockham]
|
6940
|
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
[Peirce]
|
6941
|
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
[Peirce]
|
6942
|
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
[Peirce]
|
6943
|
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
[Peirce]
|
14781
|
A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed
[Peirce]
|
19223
|
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
[Peirce]
|
4485
|
Every belief is a considering-something-true
[Nietzsche]
|
6672
|
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false'
[Moore,GE, by Lowe]
|
3212
|
Beliefs are maps by which we steer
[Ramsey]
|
6600
|
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns
[Wittgenstein]
|
24195
|
Don't reject opinions; arrange them all in a hierarchy
[Weil]
|
3816
|
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
|
3833
|
A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
3837
|
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
19308
|
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it
[Harman]
|
3570
|
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth
[Nozick, by Williams,M]
|
6783
|
To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate
[Fraassen, by Bird]
|
4760
|
Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing
[Williamson]
|
4754
|
Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires
[Engel]
|
19525
|
If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right)
[Conee/Feldman]
|
15372
|
Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true
[Horsten]
|