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Single Idea 4399
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
]
Full Idea
The platitudes of causation are that 1) causes make a difference (counterfactually or probabilistically), 2) causes are recipes for events, 3) causes explain their effects, and 4) causes are evidence for effects.
Gist of Idea
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence
Source
Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
Book Ref
Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.6
A Reaction
A nice piece of analysis which offers some problems for anyone (like Russell) who wants to analyse causation completely out of our conceptual scheme.
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[general comments on the nature of causation]:
367
|
Anaxagoras says mind produces order and causes everything
[Anaxagoras, by Plato]
|
327
|
There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine
[Plato]
|
17252
|
Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it
[Hobbes]
|
23012
|
Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions
[Newton, by Baron/Miller]
|
4772
|
If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved
[Hume]
|
2245
|
A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect
[Hume]
|
23632
|
Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects
[Reid]
|
15614
|
Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible
[Hegel]
|
15247
|
Whitehead held that perception was a necessary feature of all causation
[Whitehead, by Harré/Madden]
|
22955
|
Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics
[Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield]
|
8436
|
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual
[Bennett]
|
8441
|
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might
[Bennett]
|
10371
|
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions
[Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
|
8430
|
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories
[Kim]
|
15562
|
Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence
[Lewis]
|
8324
|
The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world
[Sosa/Tooley]
|
8404
|
Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected
[Field,H]
|
3890
|
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation
[Scruton]
|
22927
|
The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity
[Le Poidevin]
|
19068
|
Causation interests us because we want to explain change
[Mumford]
|
4399
|
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence
[Psillos]
|
4400
|
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties
[Psillos]
|
4403
|
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round
[Psillos]
|
17307
|
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges
[Schaffer,J]
|
10359
|
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
[Schaffer,J]
|
10372
|
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
[Schaffer,J]
|
10374
|
There are at least ten theories about causal connections
[Schaffer,J]
|
23782
|
Causation is the exercise of powers
[Williams,NE]
|
23785
|
Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change
[Williams,NE]
|
14566
|
Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
14577
|
Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers?
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
23011
|
Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals
[Baron/Miller]
|