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Full Idea
Just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for a 'action', so they separate strength from expressions of strength, but there is no such substratum; the deed is everything.
Gist of Idea
It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning
Source
Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§13)
Book Ref
Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'On the Genealogy of Morals/ Ecce Homo', ed/tr. Kaufmann,Walter [Vintage 1969], p.45
A Reaction
Of course, there is no reason why an analysis should not separate the doer and the deed (to explain, for example, a well-meaning fool), but it is a blunder to think of a human action as a merely physical event.
| 7999 | All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)] |
| 24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 4411 | It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche] |
| 22501 | Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 20062 | If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm] |
| 20057 | Philosophy of action studies the roles of psychological states in causing behaviour [Mele] |
| 22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
| 9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |