more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 4432

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Concept Nominalism says different things have the same property, or belong to the same kind, if the same concept in the mind is applied to different things.

Gist of Idea

'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things

Source

David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503)

Book Ref

'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.503


A Reaction

This is more appealing than Predicate Nominalism, and may be right. Our perception of the 'properties' of a thing may be entirely dictated by human interests, not by nature.


The 6 ideas with the same theme [universals are mental concepts]:

Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz]
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell]
Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]