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Full Idea
The standard objections to Predicate and Concept Nominalism are that some properties have no predicates or concepts, and that predicates and concepts seem to be types rather than particulars, and it is types the theory is seeking to analyse.
Gist of Idea
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
Source
David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.503
A Reaction
The claim that some properties have no concepts is devastating if true, but may not be. The regress problem is likely to occur in any explanation of universals, I suspect.
| 19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
| 4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
| 11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
| 4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |