more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 4436

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Class Nominalism can be defended (by Quinton) against the problem of random sets (with nothing in common), by giving an account of properties in terms of 'natural' classes, where 'natural' comes in degrees, but is fundamental and unanalysable.

Gist of Idea

'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones

Source

David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503)

Book Ref

'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.503

A Reaction

This still seems to beg the question, because you still have to decide whether two things have anything 'naturally' in common before you assign them to a set.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [universals are classes of things]:

18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
18371 The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8550 Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
20339 Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]
7032 Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
4233 If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
4471 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
14597 Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]