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Single Idea 4436
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
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Full Idea
Class Nominalism can be defended (by Quinton) against the problem of random sets (with nothing in common), by giving an account of properties in terms of 'natural' classes, where 'natural' comes in degrees, but is fundamental and unanalysable.
Gist of Idea
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
Source
David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.503
A Reaction
This still seems to beg the question, because you still have to decide whether two things have anything 'naturally' in common before you assign them to a set.
The
14 ideas
from 'Universals'
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4440
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'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
[Armstrong]
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4439
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'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
[Armstrong]
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4432
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'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things
[Armstrong]
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4431
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'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things
[Armstrong]
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4433
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Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
[Armstrong]
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4436
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'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
[Armstrong]
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4434
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'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things)
[Armstrong]
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4435
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'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members
[Armstrong]
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4437
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'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things
[Armstrong]
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4438
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'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness
[Armstrong]
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4444
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One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
[Armstrong]
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4445
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If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
[Armstrong]
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4446
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It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately
[Armstrong]
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4448
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Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
[Armstrong]
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