more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 4438

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Mereological Nominalism has some plausibility for a case like whiteness, but breaks down completely for other universals, such as squareness.

Clarification

'Mereological' means explaining relationships between parts and whotes

Gist of Idea

'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness

Source

David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503)

Book Ref

'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.503


A Reaction

A delightful request that you attempt a hopeless feat of imagination, by seeing all squares as parts of one supreme square. A nice objection.


The 5 ideas with the same theme [universals are wholes, though found in parts]:

'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]
'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]