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Single Idea 4445
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
]
Full Idea
The view that properties exist, but are particulars rather than universals, is still left with the problem of classification. On what basis do we declare that different things have the same property?
Gist of Idea
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
Source
David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.504
A Reaction
This seems like a fairly crucial objection. The original problem was how we manage to classify things (group them into sets), and it looks as if this theory leaves the problem untouched.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[arguments against the existence of tropes]:
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14327
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Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other
[Russell, by Mumford]
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15480
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Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things)
[Martin,CB]
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8538
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Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
[Armstrong]
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4445
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If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
[Armstrong]
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15750
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Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity
[Lewis]
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15749
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Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates
[Lewis]
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15748
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Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes
[Lewis]
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8527
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More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location
[Daly]
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8528
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If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all
[Daly]
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10742
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Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts
[Oliver]
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4611
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The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
[Heil]
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4483
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If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical
[Loux]
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18352
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Tropes have existence independently of any entities
[Lowe]
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8286
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Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects
[Lowe]
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8294
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How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes?
[Lowe]
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8296
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Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide?
[Lowe]
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8295
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Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle?
[Lowe]
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12253
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If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract?
[Oderberg]
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4462
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A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex
[Moreland]
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4463
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In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes
[Moreland]
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7959
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How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way?
[Macdonald,C]
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7960
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Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor
[Macdonald,C]
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