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Single Idea 4445
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
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Full Idea
The view that properties exist, but are particulars rather than universals, is still left with the problem of classification. On what basis do we declare that different things have the same property?
Gist of Idea
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
Source
David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.504
A Reaction
This seems like a fairly crucial objection. The original problem was how we manage to classify things (group them into sets), and it looks as if this theory leaves the problem untouched.
The
14 ideas
from 'Universals'
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4440
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'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
[Armstrong]
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4439
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'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
[Armstrong]
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4432
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'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things
[Armstrong]
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4431
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'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things
[Armstrong]
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4433
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Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
[Armstrong]
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4436
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'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
[Armstrong]
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4434
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'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things)
[Armstrong]
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4435
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'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members
[Armstrong]
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4437
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'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things
[Armstrong]
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4438
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'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness
[Armstrong]
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4444
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One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
[Armstrong]
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4445
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If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
[Armstrong]
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4446
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It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately
[Armstrong]
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4448
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Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
[Armstrong]
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