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Single Idea 4448
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
]
Full Idea
Should we decide what universals exist a priori (probably on semantic grounds, identifying them with the meanings of general words), or a posteriori (looking to our best general theories about nature to give revisable conjectures about universals)?
Gist of Idea
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
Source
David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.505)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.505
A Reaction
Nice question for a realist. Although the problem is first perceived in the use of language, if we think universals are a real feature of nature, we should pursue them scientifically, say I.
The
14 ideas
from 'Universals'
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4440
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'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
[Armstrong]
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4439
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'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
[Armstrong]
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4432
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'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things
[Armstrong]
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4431
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'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things
[Armstrong]
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4433
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Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
[Armstrong]
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4436
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'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
[Armstrong]
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4434
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'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things)
[Armstrong]
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4435
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'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members
[Armstrong]
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4437
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'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things
[Armstrong]
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4438
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'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness
[Armstrong]
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4444
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One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
[Armstrong]
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4445
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If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
[Armstrong]
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4446
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It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately
[Armstrong]
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4448
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Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
[Armstrong]
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