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Full Idea
Realism about universals is supported by the phenomenon of abstract reference - that is the fact that properties themselves have properties ('red is a colour'), and stand in relation to other properties ('red is more like orange than like blue').
Gist of Idea
Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties
Source
J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.6
A Reaction
While a property may be an obviously natural feature, properties of properties seem more likely to be the produce of human perception and convention. It is a good argument, though.
| 22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
| 7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
| 10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
| 8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
| 4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
| 4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
| 4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |