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Single Idea 4452

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals ]

Full Idea

Realism about universals is supported by the phenomenon of abstract reference - that is the fact that properties themselves have properties ('red is a colour'), and stand in relation to other properties ('red is more like orange than like blue').

Gist of Idea

Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties

Source

J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1)

Book Ref

Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.6

A Reaction

While a property may be an obviously natural feature, properties of properties seem more likely to be the produce of human perception and convention. It is a good argument, though.

The 24 ideas from J.P. Moreland

4451 If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
4450 The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
4453 One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
4449 Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
4454 The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
4452 Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
4459 Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
4458 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
4457 There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
4456 Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland]
4455 It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
4460 Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland]
4461 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
4462 A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
4463 In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
4464 Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
4467 A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
4469 There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
4468 How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
4471 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
4474 Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland]
4472 Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
4473 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland]
4476 Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland]