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Single Idea 4453
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
]
Full Idea
One version of realism says that the universal does not enter into the being of its instances, and thus is a One-Over-Many. One version of this is the model/copy view, but this is not widely held, because of difficulties such as the Third Man Argument.
Clarification
The 'Third Man' involves using a model to identify the model, which gives an infinite regress
Gist of Idea
One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem
Source
J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.7
A Reaction
This presumably arises if the model is held to have the properties of the copy (self-predication), and looks like a bad theory
The
24 ideas
from J.P. Moreland
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4451
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If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties?
[Moreland]
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4450
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The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes
[Moreland]
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4453
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One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem
[Moreland]
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4449
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Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals
[Moreland]
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4454
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The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars
[Moreland]
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4452
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Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties
[Moreland]
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4459
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Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals
[Moreland]
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4458
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Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
[Moreland]
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4457
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There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate
[Moreland]
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4456
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Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple
[Moreland]
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4455
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It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable
[Moreland]
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4460
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Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing
[Moreland]
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4461
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Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal
[Moreland]
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4462
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A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex
[Moreland]
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4463
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In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes
[Moreland]
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4464
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Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable
[Moreland]
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4467
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A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary
[Moreland]
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4469
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There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself
[Moreland]
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4468
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How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space?
[Moreland]
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4471
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We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear
[Moreland]
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4474
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Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating
[Moreland]
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4472
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Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity
[Moreland]
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4473
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'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists
[Moreland]
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4476
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Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false
[Moreland]
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