more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Another version of realism says is One-In-Many, where the universal is not another particular, but is literally in the instances. The universal is an abstract entity, in the instances by means of a primitive non-spatiotemporal tie of predication.
Gist of Idea
The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars
Source
J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.9
A Reaction
This sounds like Aristotle (and is Loux's view of properties and relations). If they are abstract, why must they be confined to particulars?
| 11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
| 10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
| 7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
| 10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
| 4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
| 10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |