more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 4456
[filed under theme 2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
]
Full Idea
Ockham's Razor has an epistemological version, which says we should not multiply existences or explanations without adequate reason, and an ontological version, which says reality is simple, and so a simpler ontology represents it more accurately.
Gist of Idea
Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple
Source
J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2)
Book Ref
Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.27
A Reaction
A nice distinction. Is it reality which is simple, or us? One shouldn't write off the ontological version. If one explanation is simpler than the others, there may be a reason in nature for that.
The
24 ideas
from J.P. Moreland
|
4451
|
If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties?
[Moreland]
|
|
4450
|
The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes
[Moreland]
|
|
4453
|
One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem
[Moreland]
|
|
4449
|
Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals
[Moreland]
|
|
4454
|
The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars
[Moreland]
|
|
4452
|
Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties
[Moreland]
|
|
4459
|
Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals
[Moreland]
|
|
4458
|
Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
[Moreland]
|
|
4457
|
There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate
[Moreland]
|
|
4456
|
Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple
[Moreland]
|
|
4455
|
It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable
[Moreland]
|
|
4460
|
Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing
[Moreland]
|
|
4461
|
Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal
[Moreland]
|
|
4462
|
A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex
[Moreland]
|
|
4463
|
In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes
[Moreland]
|
|
4464
|
Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable
[Moreland]
|
|
4467
|
A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary
[Moreland]
|
|
4469
|
There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself
[Moreland]
|
|
4468
|
How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space?
[Moreland]
|
|
4471
|
We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear
[Moreland]
|
|
4474
|
Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating
[Moreland]
|
|
4472
|
Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity
[Moreland]
|
|
4473
|
'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists
[Moreland]
|
|
4476
|
Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false
[Moreland]
|