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Single Idea 4464
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
]
Full Idea
Traditional realism is the view that a property is a universal construed as a multiply exemplifiable abstract entity that is a numerically identical constituent in each of its instances.
Gist of Idea
Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable
Source
J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.74
A Reaction
Put like that, it seems hard to commit oneself fully to realism. How can two red buses contain one abstract object spread out between them. Common sense says there are two 'rednesses' which resemble one another, which is a version of nominalism.
The
37 ideas
with the same theme
[single concepts applying to many things]:
11379
|
Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared
[Aristotle]
|
12096
|
Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
15034
|
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them?
[Porphyry]
|
5016
|
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident
[Descartes]
|
6487
|
Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals
[Robinson,H on Locke]
|
10533
|
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
5383
|
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal
[Russell]
|
4428
|
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives)
[Russell]
|
5406
|
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals
[Russell]
|
4479
|
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all
[Russell, by Loux]
|
8495
|
The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language
[Ramsey]
|
8493
|
We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities
[Ramsey]
|
1612
|
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism
[Quine]
|
8506
|
Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation
[Armstrong]
|
4448
|
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
[Armstrong]
|
17678
|
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world
[Armstrong]
|
13572
|
There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals
[Ellis]
|
13573
|
Universals are all types of natural kind
[Ellis]
|
10532
|
We can understand universals by studying predication
[Dummett]
|
10488
|
It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types
[Boolos]
|
15453
|
The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory
[Lewis]
|
15746
|
If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle
[Lewis]
|
15745
|
Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common
[Lewis]
|
8569
|
I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done
[Lewis]
|
8502
|
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness'
[Devitt]
|
10472
|
'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen
[Oliver]
|
4477
|
Universals come in hierarchies of generality
[Loux]
|
4481
|
Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability
[Loux]
|
8288
|
Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not
[Lowe]
|
4197
|
The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations
[Lowe]
|
10402
|
Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places
[Swoyer]
|
10318
|
Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns
[Hale]
|
10511
|
It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns
[Hale]
|
10521
|
If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations
[Hale]
|
4451
|
If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties?
[Moreland]
|
4453
|
One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem
[Moreland]
|
4464
|
Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable
[Moreland]
|