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Full Idea
If a property is held to be at the location of the particular, then if there are two objects having the same property, and one object is stationary and the other is moving, the realist is forced to say that the universal is both moving and at rest.
Gist of Idea
A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary
Source
J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.89
A Reaction
The target of this comment is D.M.Armstrong. The example nicely illustrates the problem of trying to combine science and metaphysics. It pushes you back to Platonism, but that seems wrong too…
| 22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
| 7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
| 10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
| 8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
| 4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
| 4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
| 4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |