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Full Idea
When one attends to something existing in space, one attends to an instance of redness, not to redness itself (which is a colour, which resembles orange). The facts about red itself are not spatial facts, but are traditionally seen as a priori synthetic.
Gist of Idea
There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself
Source
J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.90
A Reaction
This is the fact that properties can themselves have properties (and so on?), which seems to take us further and further from the natural world.
| 22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
| 7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
| 10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
| 8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
| 4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
| 4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
| 4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |