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Single Idea 4472

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms ]

Full Idea

Four arguments for Platonism: 1) there are truths about redness (it's a colour) even if nothing red exists, 2) redness does not depend on particulars, 3) most universals are at some time not exemplified, 4) universals satisfy the criteria of existence.

Gist of Idea

Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity

Source

J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6)

Book Ref

Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.131

A Reaction

This adds up to quite a good case, particularly the point that things can be said about redness which are independent of any particular, but the relationships between concepts and the brain seems at the heart of the problem.

The 24 ideas from J.P. Moreland

4451 If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
4450 The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
4453 One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
4449 Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
4454 The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
4452 Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
4459 Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
4458 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
4457 There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
4456 Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland]
4455 It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
4460 Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland]
4461 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
4462 A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
4463 In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
4464 Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
4467 A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
4469 There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
4468 How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
4471 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
4474 Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland]
4472 Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
4473 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland]
4476 Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland]